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Abstract 
We study the problem of a firm that faces asymmetric information about the productivity of its 
potential workers. In our framework, a worker’s productivity is either assigned by nature at birth, 
or determined by an unobservable initial action of the worker that has persistent effects over 
time. We provide a characterization of the optimal dynamic compensation scheme that attracts 
only high productivity workers: consumption –regardless of time period– is ranked according to 
likelihood ratios of output histories, and the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption 
satisfies the martingale property derived in Rogerson (1985). However, in the case of i.i.d. 
output and square root utility we show that, contrary to the features of the optimal contract for a 
repeated moral hazard problem, the level and the variance of consumption are negatively 
correlated, due to the influence of early luck into future compensation. Moreover, in this 
example long-term inequality is lower under persistent private information. 
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1 Introduction
We study the problem of a firm that faces asymmetric information about the productivity of its
potential workers. The output of the firm depends stochastically but positively on the productivity
of its employed worker. We assume that after signing the contract all work effort is observable,
so there is no further asymmetry of information. In our framework, there are two alternative
ways of interpreting the origin of the difference in productivity across workers. In one alternative,
productivity is assigned randomly by nature at birth, and it affects not only the distribution
of output in the firm but also the worker’s outside value. In a second alternative, productivity
is determined by an unobservable action of the worker taken prior to the relationship with the
firm, which has persistent effects in time. This action makes the worker more productive in the
specific job that he performs in the firm, but does not affect his outside value. We show that both
formulations fit into our model. We study how the persistence of productivity can be exploited
in long term contracts to sort workers.1 We characterize the contract that attracts only high
productivity workers at the minimum cost, and compare its properties to optimal contracts in the
presence of non—persistent asymmetric information.
The model is as follows. The contract lasts for an exogenously specified number of periods. At
the beginning of the relationship, the firm (principal) offers a contract to the worker (agent), speci-
fying consumption in each period contingent on a publicly observable history of output realizations.
If the agent accepts, they both commit to the contract. The distribution over the possible out-
put histories is stochastic and depends positively (first—order stochastic dominance) on the agent’s
productivity. Every period, the agent consumes according to the contingent scheme specified in
the contract, but he does not exert any further unobservable effort. The agent has time separable,
strictly concave utility with discounting. The principal is risk neutral. For simplicity we assume
the principal and the agent have the same discount factor, and the agent is not allowed to save.
The problem faced by the principal is to design a contract that is signed in equilibrium only by
high productivity types — implements high effort — at the lowest expected discounted cost.
Our simple model allows us to impose very few restrictions on the stochastic process for output.
This generality is useful when studying optimal compensation contracts in professions where output
informativeness about productivity varies strongly over time. Our dynamic model with persistence
captures essential features of many important long term relationships in which productivity is
unobservable, like the design of optimal compensation for CEOs, or for committees in charge of
hiring in sports clubs, editorial and record companies, or the design of a tax system that provides
incentives for human capital accumulation.2 Miller (1999) originally used a variation of the model
1See Lazear (2000) for a discussion of contingent contracts as a sorting device in a static model with risk neutral
agents. See Autor (2001) for evidence of screening efforts by firms, and a model of sorting that takes competition
into account. His model, however, focuses on the role played by temporary help supply firms, and hence does not
study the evolution of wages on the job. In a framework with heterogeneous firms and workers, Li and Sue (2000)
study the role of early matching in sorting, as observed in college admissions, summer internships in law firms, or
matching of medical interns and residents with hospitals.
2See Grochulski and Piskorski (2006) for a recent contribution to the “new public finance” literature that explicitly
models schooling effort as an unobservable investment in human capital at the beginning of life, affecting future
productivity of the agents.
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presented here to analyze a two period problem of a car insurance contract in which agents can
affect their probability of being in an accident by exerting effort when learning how to drive.
It stems from our analysis that, in spite of its dynamic structure, our moral hazard problem
with persistence can be formally studied as a static moral hazard situation (Holmström (1979),
Grossman and Hart, 1983.) In the optimal compensation scheme, all histories –regardless of time
period– are ordered by likelihood ratios, and the assigned consumption is a monotone function of
this ratio. Because the agent consumes every period, our model can be understood as a modification
of Holmström and Milgrom (1987). Hence, we confirm their conjecture that consumption in the
optimal contract is not, in general, a linear function of output, and that the principal can do better
than in the repeated effort case, because he faces less incentive constraints.
Our characterization of the optimal contract has also important implications for the dynamics
of consumption. In spite of the incentive problem being inherently static, the inverse of the mar-
ginal utility of consumption satisfies the martingale property derived in Rogerson (1985) (see also
Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski, 2003). This implies that, as in most dynamic problems with
asymmetric information, including the standard repeated moral hazard model, the agent would like
to save if he were allowed to do so, and the evolution of his expected consumption through time
depends on the concavity or convexity of the inverse of his marginal utility of consumption. When
realizations are i.i.d. over time and output takes only two values, our model provides some stark
predictions. The contract takes a simple form: the current consumption of the agent depends only
on the number of periods he has been in the contract (his tenure) and the number of high output
realizations observed to the date. Longer histories contain more information, so the dispersion of
likelihood ratios and the variance of compensation increases over time. We provide a closed form
solution for the optimal contract assuming that the utility of the agent is given by the square root of
consumption. We use this specification as our leading example, and complement it with numerical
solutions to illustrate the main general properties of the contract.
The key difference between our model and the standard incentive problems studied in most of the
literature is the persistent nature of the asymmetric information. To understand the implications
of this persistence, we use our leading example of square root utility and the i.i.d. framework to
compare the features of the optimal contract in our framework with those of the optimal contract in
a related repeated moral hazard model.3 In the standard no—persistence setting, the productivity
of a worker in a given period is determined by his hidden work effort in that particular period
only. Long term contracts are used to smooth incentives over time. Our analysis shows that the
long—term features of the optimal contracts with and without persistence are very different, and
hence persistence cannot be safely ignored in the study of optimal compensation contracts. In
our example, we find that persistence implies lower levels of long—term inequality within cohorts
of workers. Moreover, when productivity is persistent, the uncertainty faced by a worker in a
3There is a large literature in labor economics developing models that include realistic features such as worker
mobility, competition among firms for talented workers, promotions, task assignments, and learning on the job. This
literature typically contrasts its results against data (see, for example, Gibbons and Waldman (1999a, 1999b, 2006),
or Baker et al. (1994a, 1994b)). Our focus here is not to produce testable implications. Instead, we provide a simple
model that allows us to understand the role of persistence of asymmetric information. Hence, we choose to compare
the implications of our model with those of other theoretical models, and not with the data.
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given period of his career depends strongly on the previous work history. A good stream of output
realizations in early periods (early good luck) translates into low conditional variance of utility,
while early bad luck translates into higher conditional variance of utility. This implies a negative
correlation of the level and the variance of consumption over time. This contrasts again with the
predictions of the repeated effort model, in which the uncertainty over future utility streams faced
by the worker is independent of past history, implying a positive correlation of the level and the
variance of consumption over time.
Under the i.i.d. assumption for output, we show that for a contract that lasts for an infinite
number of periods the cost of implementing high effort is arbitrarily close to that of the contract
with perfect information. This result is explained by the fact that the variance of likelihood ratios
goes to infinity with time so, asymptotically, deviations can be statistically discriminated at no
cost, in the spirit of Mirrlees (1974).
To complement our analysis of the i.i.d. framework, we introduce the following variation: after
an exogenous number of periods of i.i.d. realizations, the effect of effort completely dies out. We
define the number of consecutive periods in which effort affects the distribution of output as the
“duration” of persistence. We show that increasing the duration of persistence decreases the cost
of implementing high effort. In our leading example, we show that an increase in duration not
only decreases the average variance of the per—period compensation, bringing the cost down, but
in particular it decreases the need to spread consumption in earlier periods.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in the next section. A characterization
of the optimal contract is given for a general stochastic process in section 3. Results and numerical
examples for the i.i.d. case are discussed in section 4, with a subsection devoted to the case of infinite
contracts. In section 5 we analyze the implications of changes in the duration of persistence. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
The relationship between the principal and the agent lasts for T periods, where T is finite.4 The
principal is risk neutral, and the agent has strictly concave and strictly increasing utility of con-
sumption u (c) . There is the same finite set of possible outcomes each period, Y = {yi}ni=1 , with
yi < yi+1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let Y
t denote the set of histories of outcome realizations up to time t,
with typical element yt = {y1,y2, ..., yt} . This history of outcomes is assumed to be common knowl-
edge. We model the productivity of the agent as the probability distribution over output that he
induces by working at the firm. Productivity is determined by the agent’s unobservable effort in the
first period of the relationship.5 This effort can take two possible values, e ∈ {eL, eH} .6 A contract
4A solution to the cost minimization problem presented later in this section does not exist when T =∞. The case
of infinite T is discussed later in the paper, where an asymptotic approximation result is presented.
5Section 2.1 presents the alternative interpretation in which productivity is randomly assigned by nature, as
opposed to being endogenously determined by effort. We show that the two specifications are equivalent. Hence, all
results in the paper hold in both frameworks.
6As it becomes clear in the core of the paper, the results presented here generalize to the case of multiple effort
levels, just as the results in a static moral hazard problem. With finite effort levels, it may be that some of the
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prescribes an effort to the agent at time 1, as well as a transfer c from the principal to the agent for
every period of the contract, contingent on the history of outcomes up to t: c : Y t → [cmin, cmax] ,
for t = 1, 2, ..., T . Denote the probability of a given history of outcomes, conditional on choosing
effort level e in the first period, as Pr
(
yt|e) . With this specification, we allow the distribution of
the period outcome to change over time, including the possibility that realizations are not indepen-
dent across periods (i.e., persistent output). We assume Pr
(
yt|e) strictly positive for all possible
histories and for both levels of effort, and that there exists at least one t and one yt such that
Pr
(
yt|eH
) = Pr (yt|eL). Both the agent and the principal discount cost and utility at the same
rate β. The agent cannot privately save. Commitment to the contract is assumed on both parts.7
As in most principal—agent models, the objective of the principal is to choose the level of effort
and the contingent transfers that maximize her expected profit, i.e., the difference between the
expected stream of output and the contingent transfers to the agent. In the context of a static
moral hazard problem, Grossman and Hart (1983) showed in their seminal paper that this problem
can be solved in two steps. The same procedure applies in our dynamic setting: first, for any
possible effort level, choose the sequence of contingent transfers that implements that level of effort
in the cheapest way. The cost of implementing effort e in a T period contract is just the expected
discounted stream of consumption to be provided to the agent:
K (T, e) ≡
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1
{
c
(
yt
)}
Pr
(
yt|e) .
Second, choose among the possible efforts the one that gives the biggest difference between expected
output and cost of implementation. Note that, as it is the case in static models, implementing
the lowest possible effort is trivial: it entails providing the agent with a constant consumption
each period such that he gets as much utility from being in the contract as he could get working
elsewhere. Since the interesting problem is the one of implementing eH , we assume throughout the
paper that parameters are such that in the second step the principal always finds it profitable to
implement eH . We focus on the problem of minimizing the cost of implementing high effort and,
to simplify notation, we drop the dependence of total cost on the effort level: K (T ) = K (T, eH) .
We also assume unlimited resources on the part of the principal, so we do not need to carry his
balances throughout the contract. A contract is then simply stated as a sequence of contingent
consumptions,
{
c
(
yt
)}T
t=1
.
The Participation Constraint (PC) states that the expected utility that the agent gets from a
given contract, contingent on his choice of effort, should be at least equal to the agent’s outside
utility, U :
U ≤
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|eH
)− eH , (PC)
levels are not implementable. For a continuum of efforts, our characterization may fail if the problem of the agent
corresponding to the incentive constraint is not strictly concave. Sufficient conditions are as in the first order approach
(see Rogerson (1985b), Jewitt, 1988).
7See Fudenberg, Homstrom and Milgrom (1990), Example 1, for a clear explanation of the value of commitment
in frameworks with persistence.
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where e denotes both the choice of effort and the disutility implied by it. As a benchmark, we
consider the case of effort being observable. The optimal contract in this case (sometimes referred
to as the First Best) is the solution to the following cost minimization problem:
K∗ (T ) = min
{c(yt)}T
t=1
K (T )
s.t. PC
It is easy to show that the First Best calls for perfect insurance of the agent: when effort is
observable, a constant consumption minimizes the cost of delivering the outside utility level. The
constant consumption c∗ in the First Best satisfies:
U + eH =
1− βT
1− β u (c
∗) .
Later in the paper we use the cost of the first best scheme, K∗ (T ) ≡ 1−βT1−β c∗, as a benchmark for
evaluation of the severity of the incentive problem when effort is not observable.
Given the moral hazard problem due to the unobservability of effort, the standard Incentive
Compatibility (IC) condition further constrains the choice of the contract:
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|eH
)− eH
≥
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|eL
)− eL. (IC)
In words, the expected utility of the agent when choosing the high level of effort should be at least
as high as the one from choosing the low effort. In order to satisfy this constraint, the difference in
costs of effort should be compensated by assigning higher consumption to histories that are more
likely under high effort than under low effort. Formally, the optimal contract (often referred to as
the Second Best) is the solution to the following cost minimization problem:
min
{c(yt)}T
t=1
K (T ) (CM)
s.t. PC and IC
2.1 Alternative interpretation: Sorting Types
With a simple relabeling of terms, our model applies to adverse selection problems. In these
situations, the productivity of the agent, i.e. the probability distribution over output that he
induces by working at the firm, is randomly assigned by nature. The agent knows his productivity,
but the firm cannot observe it. Productivity may be high or low: θ ∈ {θH , θL}. Denote the
probability of a given history of outcomes, conditional on productivity type, as Pr
(
yt|θH
)
. Assume
that an agent with high productivity has an outside utility of U˜H . The low productivity worker,
instead, has an outside utility of U˜L < U˜H .
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In order for the high ability workers to accept the contract, the following participation constraint
must hold:
U˜H ≤
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|θH
)
.
Relabeling U + eH = U˜H , and setting Pr
(
yt|θH
)
= Pr
(
yt|eH
)
, this equation is equivalent to our
original PC.
If the contract offered by the principal is to be accepted only by high productivity workers, the
following sorting constraint must hold:
U˜L ≥
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|θL
)
.
Letting U = U˜L, we can rewrite the sorting constraint as
U ≥
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|θL
)− eL,
which, substituting U from the PC, is equivalent to
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|θH
)− eH ≥ T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1u
(
c
(
yt
))
Pr
(
yt|θL
)− eL.
Setting Pr
(
yt|θL
)
= Pr
(
yt|eL
)
, this last equation is equivalent to our original IC. This condition is
reinterpreted here as a sorting constraint: the difference in expected utilities under the two possible
processes for output should be equal to the difference in outside utilities.
The optimal contract is signed in equilibrium only by high productivity agents. This extends
the scope of our analysis to the design of optimal contracts when firms face potential workers who
have private information about their own abilities. All results presented in the paper using the
persistent effort moral hazard framework apply to this adverse selection framework as well.
3 Characterization of the Optimal Contract for a General Process
for Output
The optimal contract can be characterized from the first order conditions of the cost minimization
problem in (CM). As in the static moral hazard case, an important term in these first order
conditions is the likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio of a history yt, denoted as LR
(
yt
)
, is
defined as the ratio of the probability of observing yt under a deviation, to the probability under
the recommended level of effort:
LR
(
yt
) ≡ Pr (yt|eL)
Pr (yt|eH) .
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Proposition 1 The optimal sequence {c (yτ )}Tτ=1 of contingent consumption in the Second Best
contract is ranked according to the likelihood ratios of the histories of output realizations, i.e., for
any two histories yt and y˜t
′
of (possibly) different lengths t and t′,
c
(
yt
)
> c
(
y˜t
′
)
⇔ LR (yt) < LR(y˜t′)
This simple characterization is due to the fact that, in spite of its dynamic structure, this
problem can be reduced to a standard static moral hazard case. We clarify this before presenting
the proof for the proposition. It is of course key that the agent chooses effort only once. This
implies that, although incentives are optimally smoothed over time, they are evaluated only once
by the agent, at the moment of choosing his action. Define γT ≡ 1−β1−βT . It is easy to see that the
principal is indifferent between minimizing the total cost of the contract as in problem CM and
solving the following normalized problem:
min
{c(yt)}T
t=1
γT
T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1
{
c
(
yt
)}
Pr
(
yt|eH
)
s.t. (γT )U ≤ γT

T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1
{
u
(
c
(
yt
))}
Pr
(
yt|eH
)− (γT ) eH (NCM)
γT

T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1
{
u
(
c
(
yt
))}
Pr
(
yt|eH
)− (γT ) eH
≥ γT

T∑
t=1
∑
yt
βt−1
{
u
(
c
(
yt
))}
Pr
(
yt|eL
)− (γT ) eL
The one to one mapping between this averaged alternative specification of the dynamic problem
and a static cost minimization problem is as follows. In the averaged formulation, the original
probability of each history yt appears adjusted by the corresponding discount factor, βt−1, and
multiplied by the averaging term γT ; together, they define a weight for time t : ω
T
t ≡ γTβt,
where
∑
t ω
T
t = 1, and the superindex indicates the dependence of this value on the length of the
contract, T. We can rename a history yt of arbitrary length as hi ∈ HT , i = 1, . . . I (T ) , where
HT ≡ ∪Tt=1Y t is the set of all possible histories in a T—period problem and I (T ) =
∑T
t=1 2
t. History
yt corresponding to hi happens with “weighted” probability
Pi (e) ≡ ωt Pr
(
yt|e) , (1)
and we have
∑
i Pi = 1. Thus, we may think of the set HT as the set of possible signals in a static
problem. Notice that the utility levels U , eL and eH in the PC and the IC are normalized as well
in the averaged problem, to the per period value that, discounted, sums up to the original utility
amount. These normalized constraints are equivalent to the dynamic ones.
In a static moral hazard problem, the information structure is given by a set of states and prob-
ability distributions over these states, conditional on the actions. The agent maximizes expected
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utility, which is a convex combination of the utility associated to each state with the correspond-
ing probabilities. As we just argued, the states in the dynamic case are all histories in HT . Each
hi ∈ HT happens with probability Pi (e). The expected discounted utility of any contingent con-
sumption plan reduces to a convex combination of the utilities in each of these states, with these
adjusted weights. Hence, in the dynamic problem the optimal compensation scheme is derived as in
the static moral hazard problem: all histories —regardless of time period— are ordered by likelihood
ratios, and the assigned consumption is a monotone function of this ratio.
Proof of Proposition 1. As we just argued, our problem is formally equivalent to a static moral
hazard problem. Our assumptions on the utility of the agent imply that the objective function
is continuous, differentiable and strictly convex. As is standard in the literature, we can write
the problem with contingent utility levels, u
(
yt
)
, as choice variables (as opposed to consumption
levels). The domain of consumption translates into a domain constraint (DC):
u
(
yt
) ∈ [u (cmin) , u (cmax)] . (DC)
The change of variables makes the constraints linear in the choice variables, so compactness and
convexity of the domain follow easily. Hence, a solution exists and is unique. Since utility is
separable in consumption and effort, the standard argument applies to show that the PC is binding.
From the FOC’s,
c
(
yt
)
:
1
u′ (c (yt))
= λ+ µ
[
1− LR (yt)] ∀yt, (2)
where λ and µ are the multipliers associated with the PC and the IC respectively. For the IC to
be satisfied it is necessary that µ > 0. Since u′ (·) is decreasing, the result follows from the above
set of equations.
As in the static problem, the contract tries to balance insurance and incentives. To achieve this
optimally, punishments (lower consumption levels) are assigned to histories of outcomes that are
more likely under a deviation than under the recommended effort, i.e., to those that have a high
likelihood ratio. Unlike in the static problem, however, in our dynamic model the distribution of
output over time determines the timing of the most informative histories, and hence the timing of
punishments. For example, if output is i.i.d., informative histories will be histories in the latest
periods of the contract, meaning incentives will be delayed. This case is studied in detail in the
next section.
It is worth noting that our framework falls into the class of problems of repeated asymmetric
information studied in Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003). Hence, it is of no surprise that
equation 2 can be combined to get the condition on the inverse of the marginal utility derived by
Rogerson (1985) in the context of a two period repeated moral hazard (RMH) problem, generalized
by Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003):
1
u′ (c (yt))
=
∑
yt+1
1
u′ (c (yt, yt+1))
Pr
(
yt+1|eH , yt
)
. (3)
This property implies that the agent, if allowed, would like to save part of his consumption transfer
every period in order to smooth his consumption over time. As shown in Rogerson (1985), it also
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implies that the expected consumption of the agent decreases with time whenever 1
u′(·) is convex,
increases if it is concave, and is constant whenever utility is logarithmic. We show in the next
section, however, that the implications for variability of consumption over the contract in our
model are very different from the repeated actions and no persistence model in Rogerson (1985).
4 Outcomes Independently and Identically Distributed
In this section, we study a particular specification of the probability distribution of output: we
assume it is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across periods. For the rest of the
paper, we analyze the two outcomes case, Yt = {yL, yH} , and we assume
Pr (yt = yH |eH) = π
Pr (yt = yH |eL) = π̂ ∀t = 1, ..., T.
with π > π̂. This assumption puts additional structure on the probability distribution of histories,
and allows for the optimal contract to be further characterized.
Note that
Pr (yt = yH |eL)
Pr (yt = yH |eH) =
π̂
π
< 1,
Pr (yt = yL|eL)
Pr (yt = yL|eH) =
1− π̂
1− π > 1.
For any history yt, the length t and the number of high realizations in the history are a sufficient
statistic for the history’s probability. Denote the number of high realizations contained in a given
history as x
(
yt
)
. The likelihood ratio of the history can be written as
LR
(
yt
)
=
(
π̂
π
)x(yt)(1− π̂
1− π
)t−x(yt)
.
Hence, in the two outcome setup there is perfect substitutability of output realizations across time.
The tuple
{
t, x
(
yt
)}
contains all the information about history yt that is used in the optimal
contract. Faced with a current output realization yt following a given history y
t−1, we only need
to know x
(
yt−1
)
to determine current consumption. Simply put, the number of high outputs in
his work history, together with his tenure in the contract are sufficient to determine the agent’s
current consumption.
Denote yt the history at t containing yt = yH for all t, that is, the history of length t that
satisfies x
(
yt
)
= t. Similarly, let yt denote the history with x
(
yt
)
= 0. The following corollary
summarizes the direct implications of Proposition 1 in the two output i.i.d. framework.
Corollary 1 Assume output can only take two values, {yL, yH} , and it is i.i.d. over time. The
following properties hold:
1. Given any history yt of any finite length t, c
(
yt, yH
)
> c
(
yt, yL
)
. In other words, the con-
sumption of the agent increases when a new high realization is observed.
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2. For any two histories of the same length yt and y˜t, c
(
yt
) ≥ c (y˜t) if and only if x (yt) ≥ x (y˜t) ,
regardless of the sequence in which the realizations occurred in each of the histories.
3. As t increases, c
(
yt
)
increases and c
(
yt
)
decreases. Hence, as t increases, c
(
yt
) − c (yt)
increases.
Property 2 is not necessarily true in the optimal contract corresponding to a RMH problem
(Rogerson, 1985). When effort is chosen every period, past realizations are less important than
recent ones in determining compensation in a given period. In particular, the spread of utility in a
given node (i.e., u
(
yH | yt−1
)− u (yL | yt−1)) is determined by effort disutility and the likelihood
ratio of the outcome in that period only. However, the level of expected utility at that node (i.e.,
E
[
u
(
yt | yt−1
)]
) depends on all past history, because the optimal contract spreads incentives for
past efforts into all future consumptions. The combination may imply that two histories with the
same x
(
yt
)
, for example yt = (yH , yL) and y˜
t = (yL, yH) , may be assigned c
(
yt
)
< c
(
y˜t
)
.8 In our
framework with persistence, however, the whole history is evaluated as a single signal about the ini-
tial effort, and hence the number of high realizations fully determines the ordering of consumption,
regardless of its timing.
Property 3 illustrates an implication of i.i.d. output on the timing of incentives. As seen in
Prop. 1, the contract optimally places incentives in periods when information is more precise. In
the i.i.d. case, these correspond to the latter periods of the contract, and it translates into a wider
range of utilities in the contract as time goes by.
As it turns out, we can further characterize the stochastic properties of consumption over time.
In order to do this, it is useful to characterize the distribution of the likelihood ratios over time,
and use its moments. We now turn to that.
Probability Distribution over likelihood ratios
To each history yt corresponds a likelihood ratio LR
(
yt
)
. The probability of observing that
particular likelihood ratio is the probability of the x
(
yt
)
that generates it. Clearly, x
(
yt
)
at t
follows a binomial distribution with t trials and a probability of success π (or π̂ if low effort is
chosen). Hence, in equilibrium, under high effort choice,
Pr
(
LR
(
yt
) |eH) = Pr (yt|eH) = ( x (yt)
t
)
πx(y
t) (1− π)t−x(yt) ,
where
(
x
t
)
denotes the standard combinatorial function. Hence, we have a well defined distri-
bution over likelihood ratios. We can calculate the expectation and the variance of the likelihood
ratios at each t. The expectation in equilibrium is constant over time, and equal to one:
E
[
LR
(
yt
) |eH] =∑
yt
Pr
(
yt|eH
) Pr (yt|eL)
Pr (yt|eH) =
∑
yt
Pr
(
yt|eL
)
= 1 ∀t.
8 In the RMH numerical example presented later in Table 2, for example, we have c (yH , yL) = 1.16 and c (yL, yH) =
2.26.
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The variance of the likelihood ratios at time t can be written in terms of the expectation of the
likelihood ratio off the equilibrium path, E
[
LR
(
yt
) |eL]. Let Ê denote this expectation at t = 1:
Ê ≡ E [LR (y1) |eL] = π̂ π̂
π
+ (1− π̂) (1− π̂)
(1− π) .
Any values of π and π̂ that satisfy our initial assumption of π > π̂ imply Ê > 1. It is easy to check
that
E
[
LR
(
yt
) |eL] = Êt.
After some algebra, we get the following expression for the variance of the likelihood ratios under
high effort, which we denote by vt :
vt ≡ V ar
(
LR
(
yt
) |eH) = Êt − 1.
Lemma 1 The variance of the likelihood ratios is an increasing and strictly convex function of t.
Proof. Since Ê > 1, the first part follows immediately from the expression for vt derived above.
For any two periods t and t+1, for t = 1, . . . , T − 1, the one—period increase in the variance equals
vt − vt−1 = Êt − 1−
(
Êt−1 − 1
)
=
(
Ê − 1
)
Êt−1,
which increases with t.
Leading example
Before moving on to analyze the properties of the optimal contract further, we provide a com-
plete closed form solution of an example, assuming u (c) = 2
√
c. This corresponds to a CRRA
utility function with coefficient of risk aversion equal to 12 . We use this specification as our leading
example.
Without loss of generality, we set cmin = 0. We limit our analysis to values of e, U , π, π̂, τ and
T that satisfy
U
e
+ 1 ≥ 1
v
[(
1− π̂
1− π
)T
− 1
]
, (4)
where v¯ denotes the weighted average across periods of the variance of the likelihood ratios:
v¯ ≡
T∑
t=1
ωTt vt.
Under condition 4, the constraint DC does not bind, (i.e.,
√
c (yt) ≥ 0 for all yt.)9 The explicit
solutions for the multipliers are:
λ =
γT (U + eH)
2
and µ =
γT (eH)
2
1
v¯
.
9 It is easy to find parameters that satisfy condition 4 (it holds in all numerical examples given in the paper.) See
Section 4.1 for a discussion of the cases when this condition is not satisfied.
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The solution for consumption is:
c
(
yt
)
=
[
λ+ µ
(
1− LR (yt))]2 ∀t, ∀yt ∈ Y t.
With this we can write expected consumption at each t as:
E [ct|eH ] = λ2 + µ2vt.
The average per period cost of the contract is then easily written as:
k (T ) =
1
γT
T∑
t=1
βt−1E [ct|eH ] = λ2 + µ2v¯ = (γT )2
1
4
[
(U + e)2 +
e2
v¯
]
. (5)
With this particular curvature of the utility function, for a given value of µ, consumption in a
given period is a convex function of the likelihood ratios. Hence, an increase in the variance of the
likelihood ratios translates into cost savings.
Long term implications of unobserved persistent productivity
In this section we derive some further properties of the process for consumption in our setup
and later we provide some comparisons with the repeated moral hazard case. We first analyze the
properties of the inverse of the marginal utility. Later in this section we discuss the relationship of
this measure to the variance of consumption.
Proposition 2 The variance of 1
u′(c(yt)) is an increasing and strictly convex function of t.Moreover,
the variance of 1
u′(c(yt)) conditional on y
t−1 decreases with x
(
yt−1
)
.
Proof. From eq. 3 and the formula for the variance we have
V ar
(
1
u′ (c (yt))
|eH
)
= µ2vt.
The result in the proposition follows from lemma 1. From the same first order conditions we have
that
E
(
1
u′ (c (yt))
|eH , yt−1
)
= λ+ µ
(
1− LR (yt−1)) .
and
V ar
(
1
u′ (c (yt))
|eH , yt−1
)
= µ2
[
LR
(
yt−1
)]2
v1,
where
[
LR
(
yt−1
)]2
v1 is the variance of LR
(
yt
)
conditional on yt−1. The result follows from the
fact that LR
(
yt−1
)
decreases with x
(
yt−1
)
.
We postpone the discussion of this proposition to state the following corollary for our leading
example.
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Corollary 2 When the agent’s utility is given by u (c) = 2
√
c, the variance of u
(
c
(
yt
))
is given
by
V ar
(
u
(
yt
))
= 4µ2vt =
(eγT
v
)2
vt.
This variance is an increasing and strictly convex function of t. Moreover, the variance of u
(
c
(
yt
))
conditional on yt−1 is given by
V ar
(
u
(
yt
) |eH , yt−1) = 4µ2 [LR (yt)]2 v1 = (eγT
v
)2 [
LR
(
yt
)]2
v1,
This variance decreases with x
(
yt−1
)
.
A measure of the information contained in histories of length t is the variance of the likelihood
ratios at time t.10 In the i.i.d. case, the higher precision of information in the latter periods of the
contract translates into an increase of vt over time. Moreover, early luck determines how important
the provision of incentives (i.e., conditional variance of utility) is in latter periods.
We now briefly discuss the relationship between the variance of the inverse of marginal utility
with the variance of consumption. First, we note that, for a widely used specification of CRRA
utility, u (c) = ln (c) , Proposition 2 characterizes the variance of ct. In general, however, a change
in the variance of the inverse of marginal utility (or in the variance of utility) does not translate
into a proportional (or even a same—sign) change in the variance of consumption. This is due to the
range of potential curvatures of the utility function. For relatively high curvatures, corresponding
to relatively low levels of consumption, an increase in the variance in utility may be achieved by
a decrease in the variance of consumption, if it happens simultaneously with a decrease in the
expected consumption. Hence, a general result for the variance of consumption cannot be stated.
In Table 1 we illustrate this point with a numerical example. The parameters for the example are
as follows:
T U e β π π̂ α
4 8 0.5 0.95 0.6 0.5 1
.
Table 1.a shows that the variance of consumption increases with t, aligned with the variance of
utility. Also, as predicted by corollary 2, the conditional variance of utility decreases with the
number of good outcomes in a history, as we report in Table 1.b for t = T . However, in this
example, V ar
(
c
(
y4
) |yL, yL, yL) = 0.06 < V ar (c (y4) |yL, yL, yH) = 0.10, i.e., the conditional
variance of consumption increases with the number of good outcomes, due to the difference in
expected consumption (which is 0.35 for the (yL, yL, yL) history and 0.94 for the (yL, yL, yH) one).
Low expected consumption makes marginal utility very high following history (yL, yL, yL). This
same effect is causing the variance of consumption to be a concave function of t, in spite of the
variance of the likelihood ratios and the variance of utility being a convex function of t.
10See Kim (1995) for a discussion of this measure, as well as two related measures: rankings over distributions of
the likelihood ratios according to (i) mean preserving spread of cumulative distributions, and (ii) Blackwel sufficiency.
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1.a) PERSISTENT Effort: Unconditional Moments
E[c
(
yt
)
] V ar[c
(
yt
)
] E[u
(
yt
)
] V ar[u
(
yt
)
]
t = 1 1.33 0.08 2.29 0.07
t = 2 1.35 0.16 2.29 0.14
t = 3 1.37 0.23 2.29 0.21
t = 4 1.38 0.29 2.29 0.29
1.b) PERSISTENT Effort: Conditional Variance at t = 4
E[c
(
y4
) | y3] V ar[c (y4) | y3] E[u (y4) | y3] V ar[u (y4) | y3]
x
(
y3
)
= 0 0.35 0.06 1.08 0.26
x
(
y3
)
= 1 0.94 0.10 1.90 0.11
x
(
y3
)
= 2 1.52 0.07 2.46 0.05
x
(
y3
)
= 3 2.01 0.04 2.83 0.02
K = 5.0281, K∗ = 4.8688
Table 1. Numerical example with persistent effort.
Comparison with long term implications of repeated (non—persistent) hidden effort
models
We concluded from the discussion in this section that our model of a contractual relationship
with moral hazard and persistence has strong long—term implications on the evolution of the utility
of the agent. It is interesting to compare these implications with those of the optimal contract in
a RMH problem.11 In a standard RMH problem, the conditional distribution of output at time t
depends only on the effort chosen by the agent at time t, that is, productivity can vary from high
to low across periods, depending on the effort choice.
For the comparison to be meaningful, we construct a RMH example in which the principal
implements high effort every period. Whenever the agent chooses high effort in a given period, he
implements a probability π of high output in the given period; this probability is π̂ if effort is low.
The objective function of the principal, hence, is equal to the one in eq. 2. We assume that effort
is equally costly every period, and the discounted sum of effort disutility is equal to e; that is, in
the RMH problem, effort disutility in a given period, denoted by e˜, satisfies:
e˜ = eγT .
11See Rogerson (1985) for a formal analysis of this standard textbook model.
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This implies that the participation constraint of this related problem is exactly as our PC equation
in page 4, and that our IC equation is one of the incentive constraints of the problem: the constraint
that choosing high effort in both periods should be preferred to choosing low in all of them. However,
the RMH problem has 2t−1 extra incentive constraints at each t, which assure that, contingent on
each of the possible 2t−1 histories in the previous period, the agent wants to choose high effort at
t, with a disutility cost of e˜ :
T∑
τ=t
∑
yt
βτ−1u
(
c
(
yτ\t
))
Pr (yτ |eH)− eH
≥
T∑
τ=t
∑
yt
βτ−1u
(
c
(
yτ\t
))
Pr (yτ |eL)− eL, (IC)
where yτ\t is the history of length τ that coincides with yt in the first t realizations.
We use the utility specification in our leading example to provide some specific comparison of the
properties of the optimal contracts. We concentrate on the long term implications for consumption
under the optimal contracts. In the RMH, the unconditional expected utility is equal to that of the
model with persistence, E
[
u
(
yt
)]
= γT (U + e) , for all t. However, the expected consumption is
not. This is due to different properties of the variance of utility. The conditional variance of utility
is
V ar
(
u˜
(
yt
) |eH , yt−1) = e˜2
v1
(
1∑T−t
j=0 β
j
)2
=
(eγT )
2
v1
(
1∑T−t
j=0 β
j
)2
. (6)
This variance grows with t as in our model with persistence, but is not conditional on past history.
This implies that the unconditional variance is simply
V ar
(
u
(
yt
) |eH) = (eγT )2
v1
t∑
τ=1
(
1∑T−τ
j=0 β
j
)2
.
Table 2 reports the moments of the numerical solution to the related RMH problem correspond-
ing to the example in Table 1. Three important differences with the persistent example stand out.
First, the total cost of the contract, K, is higher in the RMH problem. Second, as seen in Table
2.a, both the variance of utility and of consumption are a very convex function of time. Compar-
ing these values to those in Table 1.a we see that, even if this variance is lower at t = 1 in the
RMH, it becomes much higher in later periods (see Fig. 1 for a comparison). Third, as implied
by equation 6, the conditional variance of utility is independent of x
(
yt
)
in the RMH, implying
that the conditional variance of consumption increases with x
(
yt
)
. Table 2.b reports this variance,
and shows that there is a positive correlation between the level of expected consumption and the
variance of consumption. When effort is persistent, instead, this correlation between level and
variance is (mostly) negative, as reported in Table 1.b (with the exception, discussed earlier, of
nodes corresponding to histories with the lowest x
(
yt
)
, for t close to T.)
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2.a) REPEATED Effort: Unconditional Moments
E[c
(
yt
)
] V ar[c
(
yt
)
] E[u
(
yt
)
] V ar[u
(
yt
)
]
t = 1 1.32 0.04 2.29 0.03
t = 2 1.33 0.11 2.29 0.09
t = 3 1.36 0.25 2.29 0.20
t = 4 1.47 0.78 2.29 0.64
2.b) REPEATED Effort: Conditional Variance at t = 4
y3 E[c
(
y4
) | y3] V ar[c (y4) | y3] E[u (y4) | y3] V ar[u (y4) | y3]
(yL, yL, yL) 0.58 0.17 1.38 0.44
(yH , yL, yL) 0.86 0.28 1.74 0.44
(yL, yH , yL) 0.96 0.32 1.85 0.44
(yL, yL, yH) 1.18 0.41 2.07 0.44
(yH , yH , yL) 1.33 0.47 2.21 0.44
(yH , yL, yH) 1.58 0.57 2.43 0.44
(yL, yH , yH) 1.72 0.63 2.54 0.44
(yH , yH , yH) 2.21 0.83 2.90 0.44
K = 5.0783 K∗ = 4.8688
Table 2. Numerical example with repeated effort (RMH).
1 2 3 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
t
Va
r (
 c(
t) 
)
Persistence
RMH
Fig. 1. Evolution over time of the variance of consumption.
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4.1 Asymptotic Optimal Contract
If the principal and the agent can commit to an infinite contractual relationship (T =∞) and
utility is unbounded below, the cost of the contract under moral hazard can get arbitrarily close to
that of the First Best, i.e., under observable effort.
The First Best contract implies
c∗ = u−1 ((U + eH) (1− β))
and the First Best cost is
K∗ (∞) = 1
1− β c
∗.
A solution to the problem CMmay not exist when T =∞. In this section, we present an alternative
feasible and incentive compatible contract, which we call the “one—step” contract. This contract is
not necessarily optimal, but it is a useful benchmark to study because we can get an upper bound
on its cost. This bound is, in turn, an upper bound on the cost of the Second Best contract. In
the next proposition we show that the upper bound on the cost of the “one—step” contract can get
arbitrarily close to the cost of the First Best when contracts last an infinite number of periods.
A “one—step” contract is a tuple (c0, c, L) of two possible consumption levels c0 and c plus a
threshold L for the Likelihood Ratio. The contract is defined in the following way:
c(yt) =
{
c0 if LR
(
yt
) ≤ L
c if LR
(
yt
)
> L
.
Proposition 3 Assume output is i.i.d. and the agent has a utility function that satisfies limc→cmin
u (c) = −∞. For any β ∈ (0, 1] and any ε > 0, there exists a one—step contract (c0, c, L) such that
the principal can implement high effort at a cost K (∞) < K∗ (∞) + ε, where K∗ (∞) is the cost
when effort is observable.
Proof. See Appendix.
As we increase the threshold L, the set of histories that have punishment cp decreases, as
does the probability of those histories in equilibrium. Hence, a lower c is needed to guarantee
that the contract is still incentive compatible. However, as the proof shows, for the new incentive
compatible c the expected punishment decreases, allowing us to decrease c0. The intuition for this
result parallels that of Mirrlees (1974); in his static example, output realizations lie on a continuum
y ∈ [0,∞) and are distributed according to a lognormal whose mean depends on unobservable
effort. The corresponding likelihood ratio for continuous output tends to infinity as y approaches
0. In our framework, the binomial distribution of x
(
yt
)
converges to a normal distribution as t
grows; the corresponding likelihood ratios with x
(
yt
)
lying in a continuum also tend to infinity as
x
(
yt
)
approaches 0.
It should be noticed that the proof for this result depends on the unlimited punishment power
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of the principal. When utility is bounded below, however, results are less clear.12 For our leading
example, when T is finite we can always find a U(T ) such that the DC constraint does not bind.
For these parameters, we can show that difference in the cost of the second best contract and the
first best contract decreases as T increases. We can write the weighted average of the likelihood
ratios as:
v¯ (T ) = ÊγT
1−
(
βÊ
)T
1− βÊ
− 1.
We can show that
∂v¯ (T )
∂T
> 0.
Then, using the expression for the per period cost of the optimal contract, we have:
k (T )− k∗ (T ) = 1
4
γ2T
e2
v¯ (T )
., (7)
which is clearly decreasing in T. Notice that the limit of v¯ (T ) depends on βÊ as follows:
lim
T→∞
v¯ (T ) = lim
T→∞
1− β
1− βT
T∑
t=1
βt−1
(
Êt − 1
)
= lim
T→∞
1− β
1− βT
(
Ê
T∑
t=1
(
βÊ
)t−1)− 1
=

∞ if βÊ > 1
Ê 1−β
1−βÊ
− 1 if βÊ ≤ 1
,
If the DC were not to bind as T approached infinity, k (T ) would converge to k∗ only if βÊ > 1,
and would be bounded away from it by a positive number otherwise. However, the condition on
the parameters that guarantees that the DC constraint is not binding (see eq. 4) is not satisfied
when T approaches infinity. To see this, rewrite eq. 4 as
(
U
e
+ 1
) T∑
t=1
βt−1 ≥

(
1−π̂
1−π
)T − 1∑T
t=1 β
t−1
(
Êt − 1
)
 .
The left hand side of this condition converges to
(
U
e
+ 1
)
/ (1− β) as T approaches infinity. The
limit of the right hand side can be found using L’Hopitale’s rule (twice):
lim
T→∞

(
1−π̂
1−π
)T
− 1∑T
t=1 β
t−1
(
Êt − 1
)
 = −( 1−π̂1−π
βÊ
)T ln(1−π̂1−π) ln( 1β 1−π̂1−π)
Ê ln(βÊ)
1−βÊ
=∞
12We have recently become aware of an article by Jewitt, Kadan and Swinkles (2008) that studies optimal contracts
in the presence of utility bounds. They provide a formal proof of existence and uniqueness for the case discussed
here, for a general utility function specificaton and a continuum of output levels.
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Note that this limit would be 0 (and hence DC would not be binding) if βÊ > 1−π̂1−π . However,
recalling that Ê = π̂ π̂
π
+ (1− π̂) 1−π̂1−π , it is easy to see that βÊ < 1−π̂1−π always. Since eq. 4 is not
satisfied in the limit, the closed form solution for the contract derived earlier cannot be used to
analyze the optimal contract for T arbitrarily large. The solution for the multipliers λ and µ when
DC binds is modified: it depends on the set of histories for which DC binds, which, in turn, depends
on the value of λ and µ. Moreover, the PC and the IC may not bind in the optimal contract. Closed
forms are not available, but numerical examples that solve the fixed point problem for finite (but
large) T can be computed. In our numerical examples we found that, for a given Ê, high values of
β, for which βÊ > 1, implied that the cost of the second best contract got very close to that of the
first best; lower values for β for which βÊ < 1, however, implied second best contracts whose cost
seemed to quickly converge (in a small number of periods) to a number bounded away from k∗.
5 Changes in the Duration of Persistence
In this section, we consider T—period contracts in which the effect of effort on the probability
of observing high output dies out completely before the end of the contract. We introduce the
following terminology:
Definition 1 An outcome realization yt is informative whenever
Prt (yt|eH) = Prt (yt|eL) .
For informative outcomes, we maintain the i.i.d. assumption. We consider stochastic processes
that contain informative outcomes up to period τ ≥ 1, and for any t > τ they satisfy:
Prt (yt|eH) = Prt (yt|eL) = π ∀yt ∈ Yt,
i.e., outcomes after period τ are not informative. When the effect of effort dies out the probability
of the individual period realizations is the same, π, independently of whether the agent chose high
or low effort at the beginning of the contract. We refer to τ as the duration of persistence. Since
output is assumed to be i.i.d. up to τ , contracts with higher duration have a richer information
structure. This allows us to show, in the next proposition, that a longer duration of persistence
allows the implementation of high effort at a lower cost.
Proposition 4 The cost of a contract strictly decreases if the duration of persistence, τ , increases.
The structure of the contract is easy to characterize. When τ < T , the likelihood ratio of any
uninformative history following yτ remains constant and equal to LR (yτ ) :
LR
(
yt
) ≡

Pr(yt|eL)
Pr(yt|eH)
for t ≤ τ
Pr(yτ |eL)
Pr(yτ |eH)
for t > τ.
Hence, by the first order conditions, consumption is constant from τ until T. The result in Prop. 4
is illustrated in the following corollary for our leading example.
19
Corollary 3 If the agent’s utility is given by u = 2
√
c, an increase in the duration of the contract
from τ1 to τ2 > τ1 implies a lower cost of the contract, lower average variance of utility, and lower
variance of utility in any period t ≤ τ1.
We can prove the result directly. Let subscript i denote variables corresponding to a contract
of duration τ i. We have
vti =
{
Êt − 1 for t ≤ τ i
0 for t > τ i.
It is easy to see that τ1 < τ2 implies v¯1 < v¯2.This, in turn, implies µ1 > µ2 and, by eq. (5),
k2 (T ) < k1 (T ) . For the second part of the corollary, recall that we can express variance of utility
as a function of v¯ using the solution for µ, as in Corollary 2. For every t ≤ τ1 we have vt1 = vt2;
since v¯1 < v¯2, this makes the variance of utility lower under duration τ2 for those periods.
When duration increases, the value of v¯ increases, which lowers µ. The individual variances
vt of the periods that had informative outcomes, however, remain unchanged. As a result, less
incentives are allocated to the early periods. This is intuitive since, with higher duration, more
informative realizations are available in late periods.
Note that, when duration τ is finite, the asymptotic result breaks down. In the proof of Prop.
3, we can no longer be sure to find a yt such that LR
(
yt
)
> L for any arbitrarily large L. In our
leading example, since the weights ωt converge to (1− β)βt−1, the weighted variance converges to
a finite number and the cost of the contract is bounded away from the first best.
PERSISTENT Effort: Unconditional Moments
E[c
(
yt
)
] V ar[c
(
yt
)
] E[u
(
yt
)
] V ar[u
(
yt
)
]
t = 1 1.33 0.10 2.29 0.08
t = 2 1.36 0.20 2.29 0.17
t = 3 1.38 0.28 2.29 0.26
t = 4 1.38 0.28 2.29 0.26
K = 5.0464 K∗ = 4.8688
Table 3. Numerical example with duration of persistence τ = 3.
Table 3 presents a numerical example that illustrates the implications of changes in duration.
In all periods but the last, we observe higher variance of consumption than in the example of Table
1 (which corresponds to τ = T .) This translates into higher cost of the contract. The increase in
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variance is spread evenly across periods (approximately 1.24 times the variance of consumption in
Table 1, for the first three periods). We do not report the conditional variance in period 4, since it
is zero for all histories, reflecting the fact that compensation stays constant after period 3.
Longer duration of persistence means more information. More information translates into a
lower value of the multiplier of the IC constraint, µ, reflecting the fact that the IC is easier to
satisfy. However, the availability of better quality information is materialized in more extreme
values of the likelihood ratios. Rearranging the first order conditions of the Second Best we have
that for any two histories yt and y˜t˜ of any length,
1
u′ (c (yt))
− 1
u′
(
c
(
y˜t˜
)) = µ
Pr
(
y˜t˜|eL
)
Pr
(
y˜t˜|eH
) − Pr (yt|eL)
Pr (yt|eH)
 . (8)
The patterns for the variability of compensation that we described in this section can be understood
in terms of contemporaneous changes in the likelihood ratios and in µ. For the square root utility,
eq. 8 means that the difference in utility is proportional to the difference in the likelihood ratios;
for logarithmic utility, it is the difference in consumption levels. The factor of proportionality
between differences in likelihood ratios and differences in compensation is µ. In the increases in the
duration of persistence studied in this section, we have shown that the decrease in the multiplier
(the sensitivity of compensation to the likelihood ratios) is large enough so that variability of
compensation decreases.
6 Conclusion
We study a simple representation of the problem of a firm that hires from a pool of workers
heterogeneous in their productivity. This productivity is private information of the worker, and
is persistent: it affects the distribution of output of the firm in every period in which a worker is
employed. The optimal contract derived in this paper suggests that, whenever commitment to long
term contracts is available, the efficient provision of incentives calls for an increase in the variability
of consumption over time. Moreover, the larger the differences in unobserved productivity, the
bigger the efficiency gains from postponing incentives, and the higher the level of insurance provided
to the agent in early periods. In the special case of i.i.d. output and square root utility, the optimal
contract implies a negative correlation of the level and the variance of consumption, in contrast
with the optimal contract in a setting of repeated moral hazard.
Our model is only a partial approximation to the problem of compensation design in the pres-
ence of persistent hidden information. In its simplicity, it abstracts from an important feature
in many interesting examples: the agents may be able, or required, to exert further unobservable
efforts during their relationship with their employers — efforts that may or may not be persistent.
Such examples include the design of unemployment schemes, CEO compensation, or optimal wage
schemes in any industry in which the productivity of workers depends both on everyday effort and
their persistent productivity.
Combining a repeated effort incentive problem with the persistence framework presented here,
then, is a natural next step towards understanding the importance of persistence in many relevant
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contracting environments. Some important contributions have been made in this direction, which
may be classified into two groups. First, Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and Doepke and Townsend
(2006) provided useful recursive formulations, which can be used to compute the solution to specific
examples. Although they do not allow for a characterization of the optimal contract, these recursive
formulations highlight one important difficulty in problems with persistence: there is no common
knowledge of preferences at the beginning of each period. Hence, the principal needs to check
the potential profitability of joint deviations of effort that would be easily ruled out if effort were
not persistent. In our paper, we deal with this difficulty proposing a model that eliminates the
joint deviations, while capturing the main features of an information system in the presence of
persistence.
A second group of papers provides some interesting characterizations of the optimal contracts,
for particular examples. Mukoyama and Sahin (2005) and Kwon (2006) study a similar problem
with repeated persistent efforts. They restrict their analysis to cases in which the principal imple-
ments high, equally costly, effort every period. When early effort is assumed to have higher impact
on later period’s outcomes than later efforts, these papers show that perfect insurance may arise
in the early periods, in sharp contrast with the repeated moral hazard predictions. Jarque (2008)
studies a repeated moral hazard problem with a continuum of efforts under two main assumptions:
linear disutility in effort and linear effect of past efforts on the persistent productive state that
determines the probability distribution over output. She finds that the contract has the same prop-
erties as a repeated moral hazard problem, since it is optimal for the principal to regard the level
of the productive state as if it were the level of effort in a standard problem without persistence.
The assumptions in these three frameworks make a characterization possible, but at the expense
of restricting the structure of persistence. Our model allows us to explore the implications of more
general output processes.
In our paper, we compare the model with persistent productivity to one with repeated moral
hazard. We believe that this comparison also provides some interesting insights on the results
in the literature on moral hazard and persistence mentioned above. The persistent structure of
incentives that we characterize in our framework with only one effort is particularly simple because
only two distributions over output need to be statistically discriminated (i.e., there is only one
incentive constraint.) If the agent has the possibility of deviating every period, as in the repeated
moral hazard problem, an extra incentive constraint appears every period and for each possible
past history of output. Two distributions over output need to be discriminated in every period,
corresponding to high or low effort in the given period. If these efforts are persistent, as in the three
papers above, the number of potential distributions driving output increases: in any given period,
the equilibrium distribution has to be contrasted with the multiple different distributions resulting
from every possible combination of past efforts. By imposing an ordering over these distributions
that translates easily into an ordering of expected utility for the agent, the papers cited above are
able to characterize the solution to the optimal contract.
A general characterization of the optimal contract in a problem with repeated persistent effort
would need to evaluate the relative importance of each deviation, as opposed to assuming it. We
conjecture from our analysis that this will depend on the correlation of the different distributions
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under different effort deviations; weighted sums of likelihood ratios of histories are likely to be useful
in the characterization. However, it is also true that more needs to be learnt about a second effect
that arises in the presence of persistence: in general, the agent aims to smooth effort disutility over
time. Our work abstracts completely from this problem. The literature on repeated moral hazard
with hidden savings suggests that recursive formulations with added state variables, and hence
involved computations, may be needed to establish the implications of this effect on the optimal
contract.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Let δ and P satisfy the following two equations:
u (c0) = u0 = u (c
∗) + δ,
where c∗ is the level of consumption provided in the First Best, and
u (c) = u0 − P.
For a given L and for each possible date t, denote by At (L) the set including all histories of length
t such that their likelihood ratio is lower than the threshold L, so they are assigned a consumption
equal to c0. Denote by Act (L) the complement of that set; that is:
At (L) =
{
yt | LR (yt) ≤ L} and
Act (L) =
{
yt | LR (yt) > L} ∀t.
Define Ft (L) and F̂t (L) as the total probability of observing a history in At (L) for high and low
effort, correspondingly:
Ft (L) =
∑
yt∈At(L)
Pr
(
yt|eH
)
F̂t (L) =
∑
yt∈At(L)
Pr
(
yt|eL
)
.
Given this one—step contract, the expected utility of the agent from choosing high effort is
u0
1− β − P
∑
t
βt−1 (1− Ft (L))− eH .
We can find the maximum c —or, equivalently, the minimum punishment P — that satisfies the IC:
−P
∑
t
βt−1 (1− Ft (L))− eH = −P
∑
t
βt−1
(
1− F̂t (L)
)
− eL
so we can write
P (L) =
eH − eL∑
t β
t−1
(
Ft (L)− F̂t (L)
) .
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Now we can write the PC substituting P (L), which pins down u0 :
U + eH =
u0
1− β − (eH − eL)
∑
t β
t−1 (1− Ft (L))∑
t β
t−1
(
Ft (L)− F̂t (L)
)
Since u (c∗) = (U + eH) (1− β) and u0 = u (c∗) + δ,
δ (L) = (eH − eL)
∑
t β
t−1 (1− Ft (L))∑
t β
t−1
(
Ft (L)− F̂t (L)
) (1− β) . (9)
Consider the following upper bound for the cost of the two-step contract:
K (∞) < c0
1− β =
u−1 (u (c∗) + δ (L))
1− β .
The actual cost will be strictly lower than c01−β since, with probability
∑
t β
t−1 (1− Ft (L)) > 0 the
agent receives c. The final step of the proof is to show that by increasing L we can decrease the
cost of the contract, since δ (L) is decreasing in L. When L increases, (1− Ft (L)) decreases in all
periods were it was positive. In those same periods, both Ft (L) and F̂t (L) increase, but we have:
1− F̂t (L)
1− Ft (L) > L
1− F̂t (L) > L (1− Ft (L))
1− F̂t (L)− (1− Ft (L)) > L (1− Ft (L))− (1− Ft (L))
Ft (L)− F̂t (L) > (1− Ft (L)) (L− 1) .
This implies ∑
t
βt−1
(
Ft (L)− F̂t (L)
)
> (L− 1)
∑
t
βt−1 (1− Ft (L)) .
Substituting this inequality in expression (9),
δ (L) <
1
L− 1 (eH − eL) .
We have that δ (L) is decreasing in L as long as
∑
t β
t−1
(
Ft (L)− F̂t (L)
)
> 0 for L. From the
above inequalities, this will hold whenever 1 − F̂t (L) > 0 for some t. For the discrete case, this
holds if there exists a path yt such that L
(
yt
)
> L, which is guaranteed in the i.i.d. case. Hence,
for any ε > 0 we can find an L low enough so that K (∞) < K∗ (∞) + ε .
Proof of Proposition 4. Denote by C1 =
{
c1
(
yt
)}T
t=1
the optimal contract corresponding to a
persistence of duration τ1. Consider a change in duration from τ1 to τ2, where τ2 > τ1. Denote
the corresponding new optimal contract as C2 =
{
c2
(
yt
)}T
t=1
. First, note that C1 is feasible and
incentive compatible under τ2: both the PC and the IC of the problem under τ2 are satisfied by the
C1 contract. However, C1 does not satisfy the first order conditions of C2 for any strictly positive
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value of λ and µ : at any t such that τ1 < t ≤ τ2 the FOC corresponding to τ2 implies a different
consumption following yL than following yH , for any y
t−1, since LR
(
yt−1, yL
) = LR (yt−1, yH) for
all yt−1. Contract C1, however, implies a constant consumption for those histories, since outcomes
in that period range are not informative and hence LR
(
yt−1, yL
)
= LR
(
yt−1, yH
)
for all yt−1.
Since the solution for the optimal contract is unique, we conclude that although C1 is feasible and
incentive compatible under τ2, it is not the solution to the cost minimization problem under τ2:
this establishes that the total cost of C2 is strictly smaller than that of C1.
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